

Proving Safety Properties of Rewrite Theories

Camilo Rocha José Meseguer

Department of Computer Science
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

4th Conference on Algebra and Coalgebra in Computer Science
August 31, 2011
Winchester, UK

Main Contribution

A deductive method and an infrastructure for proving **safety properties** of rewrite theories

Main Contribution

A deductive method and an infrastructure for proving **safety properties** of rewrite theories

- a proof system that reduces the verification task of proving **stability** and **invariance** properties of concurrent rewrites to a first-order equational inductive theorem proving task

Main Contribution

A deductive method and an infrastructure for proving **safety properties** of rewrite theories

- a proof system that reduces the verification task of proving **stability** and **invariance** properties of concurrent rewrites to a first-order equational inductive theorem proving task
 - it can be applied to infinite-state systems and can assume infinite sets of initial states


Main Contribution

A deductive method and an infrastructure for proving **safety properties** of rewrite theories

- a proof system that reduces the verification task of proving **stability** and **invariance** properties of concurrent rewrites to a first-order equational inductive theorem proving task
 - it can be applied to infinite-state systems and can assume infinite sets of initial states
- the Maude Invariant Analyzer Tool (**InvA**) is an implementation in Maude of the inference system above that can automatically discharge many proof obligations without user intervention


Motivation

The QLOCK Protocol



Motivation

The QLOCK Protocol



Transitions

$n, n' : \text{Nat}$

$S_i, S_w, S_c : \text{NatSoup}$

$Q : \text{NatQueue}$

$$n S_i \mid S_w \mid S_c \mid Q \longrightarrow S_i \mid n S_w \mid S_c \mid Q ; (n @ \text{nil})$$

$$S_i \mid n S_w \mid S_c \mid n @ Q \longrightarrow S_i \mid S_w \mid n S_c \mid n @ Q$$

$$S_i \mid S_w \mid n S_c \mid n' @ Q \longrightarrow n S_i \mid S_w \mid S_c \mid Q$$

Motivation

Mutual Exclusion in the QLOCK Protocol

Consider an initial state in which all processes are in state `inactive`. How do we check that there is at most one process in the critical section at any point of execution, i.e., that QLOCK satisfies the mutual exclusion property?

Transitions

$n, n' : \text{Nat}$

$Si, Sw, Sc : \text{NatSoup}$

$Q : \text{NatQueue}$

$n Si \mid Sw \mid Sc \mid Q \longrightarrow Si \mid n Sw \mid Sc \mid Q ; (n @ nil)$

$Si \mid n Sw \mid Sc \mid n @ Q \longrightarrow Si \mid Sw \mid n Sc \mid n @ Q$

$Si \mid Sw \mid n Sc \mid n' @ Q \longrightarrow n Si \mid Sw \mid Sc \mid Q$

Outline

- 1 Preliminaries
- 2 Safety Properties
- 3 Proving Stability and Invariance Properties
- 4 Strengthening of Invariants
- 5 The Maude Invariant Analyzer

Rewrite Theories

In what follows, we assume $\mathcal{R} = (\Sigma, E \cup A, R)$ is such that:

- the equations E are ground Church-Rosser, ground strongly normalizing, and ground coherent w.r.t. R modulo A
- it is topmost, i.e., Σ has a topmost sort \mathfrak{s} and each rule $l \rightarrow r$ if $cond \in R$ has $l, r \in T_{\Sigma}(X)_{\mathfrak{s}}$
- E and R can be conditional

Rewrite Theories

In what follows, we assume $\mathcal{R} = (\Sigma, E \cup A, R)$ is such that:

- the equations E are ground Church-Rosser, ground strongly normalizing, and ground coherent w.r.t. R modulo A
- it is topmost, i.e., Σ has a topmost sort \mathfrak{s} and each rule $l \rightarrow r$ if $cond \in R$ has $l, r \in T_{\Sigma}(X)_{\mathfrak{s}}$
- E and R can be conditional

and let:

- $\mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{R}} = (\Sigma, E \cup A)$
- $\mathcal{T}_{\Sigma/E \cup A}$ be the initial algebra of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{R}}$
- $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} = (\mathcal{T}_{\Sigma/E \cup A}, \xrightarrow{*}_{\mathcal{R}})$ be the initial reachability model of \mathcal{R}

State Predicates

We let Π be a set of **state predicates** for $\mathcal{R} = (\Sigma, E \cup A, R)$, which are equationally-defined in an equational theory $\mathcal{E}_\Pi = (\Sigma_\Pi, E \cup A \cup E_\Pi)$ such that:

State Predicates

We let Π be a set of **state predicates** for $\mathcal{R} = (\Sigma, E \cup A, R)$, which are equationally-defined in an equational theory $\mathcal{E}_\Pi = (\Sigma_\Pi, E \cup A \cup E_\Pi)$ such that:

- Σ_Π contains Σ , two sorts $Bool \leq [Bool]$ with constants \top and \perp of sort $Bool$, predicate symbols $P : \mathfrak{s} \rightarrow [Bool]$ for each $P \in \Pi$, and optionally some auxiliary function symbols

State Predicates

We let Π be a set of **state predicates** for $\mathcal{R} = (\Sigma, E \cup A, R)$, which are equationally-defined in an equational theory $\mathcal{E}_\Pi = (\Sigma_\Pi, E \cup A \cup E_\Pi)$ such that:

- Σ_Π contains Σ , two sorts $Bool \leq [Bool]$ with constants \top and \perp of sort $Bool$, predicate symbols $P : \mathfrak{s} \rightarrow [Bool]$ for each $P \in \Pi$, and optionally some auxiliary function symbols
- the equations E_Π define the predicate symbols in Σ_Π and the auxiliary function symbols, and they protect both $\mathcal{E}_\mathcal{R}$ and the theory `BOOL` specifying the sort $Bool$, \top , \perp , and the Boolean operations

State Predicates

We let Π be a set of **state predicates** for $\mathcal{R} = (\Sigma, E \cup A, R)$, which are equationally-defined in an equational theory $\mathcal{E}_\Pi = (\Sigma_\Pi, E \cup A \cup E_\Pi)$ such that:

- Σ_Π contains Σ , two sorts $Bool \leq [Bool]$ with constants \top and \perp of sort $Bool$, predicate symbols $P : \mathfrak{s} \rightarrow [Bool]$ for each $P \in \Pi$, and optionally some auxiliary function symbols
- the equations E_Π define the predicate symbols in Σ_Π and the auxiliary function symbols, and they protect both $\mathcal{E}_\mathcal{R}$ and the theory `BOOL` specifying the sort $Bool$, \top , \perp , and the Boolean operations
- the equations $E \cup E_\Pi$ are ground confluent, ground strongly normalizing, and ground coherent w.r.t. R modulo A

Temporal Operators

Next (\bigcirc)

Definition (Next)

Let P be a state predicate defined on the set of states of $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}$:

- for $t \in T_{\Sigma, s}$, we say that

$$\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}, t \models \bigcirc P \iff (\forall u \in T_{\Sigma, s}) \mathcal{R} \vdash t \xrightarrow{1} u \implies \mathcal{E}_{\Pi} \vdash P(u) = \top$$

- we define

$$\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models \bigcirc P \iff (\forall t \in T_{\Sigma, s}) \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}, t \models \bigcirc P$$

Temporal Operators

Always (\Box)

Definition (Always)

Let P be a state predicate defined on the set of states of $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}$:

- for $t \in T_{\Sigma, s}$, we say that

$$\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}, t \models \Box P \iff (\forall u \in T_{\Sigma, s}) \mathcal{R} \vdash t \xrightarrow{*} u \implies \mathcal{E}_{\Pi} \vdash P(u) = \top$$

- we define

$$\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models \Box P \iff (\forall t \in T_{\Sigma, s}) \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}, t \models \Box P$$

Outline

- 1 Preliminaries
- 2 Safety Properties**
- 3 Proving Stability and Invariance Properties
- 4 Strengthening of Invariants
- 5 The Maude Invariant Analyzer

Safety Properties

Main Idea

Safety Properties

We are interested in verifying **safety properties** of the form

$$\mathcal{T}_R \models I \Rightarrow \Box P$$

with I and P state predicates in Π . I denotes the set of **initial states** and P is the **invariant**.

Stability

For P a state predicate defined on the set of states of $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}$, P -stability is the safety property

$$\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models P \Rightarrow \Box P$$

intuitively expressing that once P becomes true, it remains true forever.

Definition (Stability)

Let $P \in \Pi$. We define P -**stability** for $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}$ as follows:

$$\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models P \Rightarrow \Box P \iff (\forall t \in T_{\Sigma, s}) \mathcal{E}_{\Pi} \vdash P(t) = \top \implies \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}, t \models \Box P$$

Invariance

For I and P state predicates defined on the set of states of $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}$, P -invariance from a set I of initial states is the safety property

$$\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models I \Rightarrow \Box P$$

intuitively expressing that once I becomes true, P is true forever.

Definition (Invariance)

Let $I, P \in \Pi$. We define **P -invariance from I** for $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}$ as follows:

$$\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models I \Rightarrow \Box P \iff (\forall t \in T_{\Sigma, s}) \mathcal{E}_{\Pi} \vdash I(t) = \top \implies \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}, t \models \Box P$$

Mutual Exclusion for QLOCK

Predicates

$n, n' : \text{Nat}$

$Si, Sw, Sc : \text{NatSoup}$

$Q : \text{NatQueue}$

$\text{init} : \text{State} \rightarrow [\text{Bool}]$

$\text{mutex} : \text{State} \rightarrow [\text{Bool}]$

$\text{init}(Si \mid mt \mid mt \mid nil) = \text{set?}(Si)$

$\text{mutex}(Si \mid Sw \mid mt \mid Q) = \top$

$\text{mutex}(Si \mid Sw \mid n \mid Q) = \top$

$\text{mutex}(Si \mid Sw \mid n, n', Sc \mid Q) = \perp$

Mutual Exclusion for QLOCK

Predicates

$n, n' : \text{Nat}$

$S_i, S_w, S_c : \text{NatSoup}$

$Q : \text{NatQueue}$

$\text{init} : \text{State} \rightarrow [\text{Bool}]$

$\text{mutex} : \text{State} \rightarrow [\text{Bool}]$

$\text{init}(S_i \mid \text{mt} \mid \text{mt} \mid \text{nil}) = \text{set?}(S_i)$

$\text{mutex}(S_i \mid S_w \mid \text{mt} \mid Q) = \top$

$\text{mutex}(S_i \mid S_w \mid n \mid Q) = \top$

$\text{mutex}(S_i \mid S_w \mid n, n', S_c \mid Q) = \perp$

Mutual exclusion for QLOCK can be expressed by the invariant property

$$\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \square \text{mutex}$$

Outline

- 1 Preliminaries
- 2 Safety Properties
- 3 Proving Stability and Invariance Properties**
- 4 Strengthening of Invariants
- 5 The Maude Invariant Analyzer

The Proof System

The proof system comprises two groups of inference rules:

- **reduction inference rules** used to reduce stability and invariance properties for $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}$ to properties of the form $P \Rightarrow Q$ and $P \Rightarrow \bigcirc P$
- **descent inference rules** used to reduce properties of the form $P \Rightarrow Q$ and $P \Rightarrow \bigcirc P$ for $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}$ to equational inductive reasoning in \mathcal{E}_{Π}

Reduction Inference Rules

For Stability and Invariance Properties

Theorem

For $I, P \in \Pi$ state predicates defined on the set of states of $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}$, the following reduction inference rules are sound:

$$\frac{\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models P \Rightarrow \bigcirc P}{\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models P \Rightarrow \square P} \text{ST}$$

$$\frac{\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models I \Rightarrow P \quad \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models P \Rightarrow \square P}{\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models I \Rightarrow \square P} \text{INV}$$

Proving the Mutual Exclusion for QLOCK

Composing ST and INV for the mutual exclusion of QLOCK, we get:

$$\frac{\frac{}{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \text{mutex}} \quad \frac{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{mutex} \Rightarrow \bigcirc \text{mutex}}{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{mutex} \Rightarrow \square \text{mutex}}}{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \square \text{mutex}}$$

Proving the Mutual Exclusion for QLOCK

Composing ST and INV for the mutual exclusion of QLOCK, we get:

$$\frac{\frac{\text{?}}{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \text{mutex}} \quad \frac{\frac{\text{?}}{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{mutex} \Rightarrow \bigcirc \text{mutex}}}{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{mutex} \Rightarrow \square \text{mutex}}}{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \square \text{mutex}}$$

Descent Inference Rules

Theorem

For $P, Q \in \Pi$ state predicates defined on the set of states of $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}$, the following descent inference rules are sound:

$$\frac{\mathcal{E}_{\Pi} \vdash_{\text{ind}} (\forall x : \mathfrak{s}) P(x) = \top \Rightarrow Q(x) = \top}{\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models P \Rightarrow Q} \text{EQ-D}$$

$$\frac{\{\mathcal{E}_{\Pi} \vdash_{\text{ind}} (\forall \mathbf{y} : \mathbf{s}) (P(l) = \top \wedge C) \Rightarrow P(r) = \top\}_{(l \rightarrow r \text{ if } C) \in R}}{\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models P \Rightarrow \bigcirc P} \text{REW-D}$$

Streamlining REW-D

In the inference rule REW-D, how can we prove for $l \rightarrow r$ if $C \in R$ that

$$\mathcal{E}_{\Pi} \vdash_{\text{ind}} (\forall \mathbf{y} : \mathbf{s}) (P(l) = \top \wedge C) \Rightarrow P(r) = \top ?$$

Streamlining REW-D

In the inference rule REW-D, how can we prove for $l \rightarrow r$ if $C \in R$ that

$$\mathcal{E}_{\Pi} \vdash_{\text{ind}} (\forall \mathbf{y} : \mathbf{s}) (P(l) = \top \wedge C) \Rightarrow P(r) = \top ?$$

Key idea: 1-step narrowing with the predicate P in the condition!!!

Streamlining REW-D

In the inference rule REW-D, how can we prove for $l \rightarrow r$ if $C \in R$ that

$$\mathcal{E}_\Pi \vdash_{\text{ind}} (\forall \mathbf{y} : \mathbf{s}) (P(l) = \top \wedge C) \Rightarrow P(r) = \top ?$$

Key idea: 1-step narrowing with the predicate P in the condition!!!

- assume l and each v in $P(v) = w$ if $D \in E_\Pi$ are free constructor terms modulo A

Streamlining REW-D

In the inference rule REW-D, how can we prove for $l \rightarrow r$ if $C \in R$ that

$$\mathcal{E}_\Pi \vdash_{\text{ind}} (\forall \mathbf{y} : \mathbf{s}) (P(l) = \top \wedge C) \Rightarrow P(r) = \top ?$$

Key idea: 1-step narrowing with the predicate P in the condition!!!

- assume l and each v in $P(v) = w$ if $D \in E_\Pi$ are free constructor terms modulo A
- then, for each ground substitution α , $\mathcal{E}_\Pi \vdash P(l\alpha) = \top$ if and only if there is $P(v) = w$ if $D \in E_\Pi$ and substitutions θ and γ , such that $l\theta =_A v\theta$, $\alpha =_{E \cup A} \theta\gamma$, and $\mathcal{E}_\Pi \vdash C\theta\gamma \wedge D\theta\gamma \wedge w\theta\gamma = \top$

Streamlining REW-D

In the inference rule REW-D, how can we prove for $l \rightarrow r$ if $C \in R$ that

$$\mathcal{E}_\Pi \vdash_{\text{ind}} (\forall \mathbf{y} : \mathbf{s}) (P(l) = \top \wedge C) \Rightarrow P(r) = \top ?$$

Key idea: 1-step narrowing with the predicate P in the condition!!!

- assume l and each v in $P(v) = w$ if $D \in E_\Pi$ are free constructor terms modulo A
- then, for each ground substitution α , $\mathcal{E}_\Pi \vdash P(l\alpha) = \top$ if and only if there is $P(v) = w$ if $D \in E_\Pi$ and substitutions θ and γ , such that $l\theta =_A v\theta$, $\alpha =_{EUA} \theta\gamma$, and $\mathcal{E}_\Pi \vdash C\theta\gamma \wedge D\theta\gamma \wedge w\theta\gamma = \top$
- let $\text{CSU}_A(l = v)$ be the set of most general A -unifiers of the Σ -equation $l = v$

Streamlining REW-D

In the inference rule REW-D, how can we prove for $l \rightarrow r$ if $C \in R$ that

$$\mathcal{E}_\Pi \vdash_{\text{ind}} (\forall \mathbf{y} : \mathbf{s}) (P(l) = \top \wedge C) \Rightarrow P(r) = \top ?$$

Key idea: 1-step narrowing with the predicate P in the condition!!!

- assume l and each v in $P(v) = w$ if $D \in E_\Pi$ are free constructor terms modulo A
- then, for each ground substitution α , $\mathcal{E}_\Pi \vdash P(l\alpha) = \top$ if and only if there is $P(v) = w$ if $D \in E_\Pi$ and substitutions θ and γ , such that $l\theta =_A v\theta$, $\alpha =_{E_{UA}} \theta\gamma$, and $\mathcal{E}_\Pi \vdash C\theta\gamma \wedge D\theta\gamma \wedge w\theta\gamma = \top$
- let $\text{CSU}_A(l = v)$ be the set of most general A -unifiers of the Σ -equation $l = v$

Then, we can streamline REW-D as follows:

$$\frac{\{\mathcal{E}_\Pi \vdash_{\text{ind}} (\forall \text{ran}(\theta)) (C\theta \wedge D\theta \wedge w\theta = \top) \Rightarrow P(r\theta) = \top\}^{P(v)=w \text{ if } D \in E_\Pi}}{\mathcal{T}_R \models P \Rightarrow \bigcirc P} \quad \{l \rightarrow r \text{ if } C\} \in R, \theta \in \text{CSU}_A(l=v)$$

Outline

- 1 Preliminaries
- 2 Safety Properties
- 3 Proving Stability and Invariance Properties
- 4 Strengthening of Invariants**
- 5 The Maude Invariant Analyzer

Strengthening of Invariants

Strengthening of invariants is an important technique for verifying safety properties.

- a **strengthening** for $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models I \Rightarrow \Box P$ is a state predicate $Q \in \Pi$ such that $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models I \Rightarrow \Box Q$ and Q can be used to prove $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models I \Rightarrow \Box P$
- state predicate Q is the result of a gradual refinement of a too-weakly defined P for which $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models I \Rightarrow \Box P$ cannot be proven directly using the inference rules mentioned so far

Strengthening Rules

Theorem

For $I, J, P, Q \in \Pi$ state predicates defined on the set of states of $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}$, the following strengthening inference rules are sound:

$$\frac{\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models I \Rightarrow J \quad \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models J \Rightarrow \Box Q \quad \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models Q \Rightarrow P}{\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models I \Rightarrow \Box P} \text{STR1}$$

$$\frac{\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models I \Rightarrow P \quad \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models I \Rightarrow \Box Q \quad \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models Q \wedge P \Rightarrow \bigcirc P}{\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}} \models I \Rightarrow \Box P} \text{STR2}$$

Strengthening for the Mutual Exclusion of QLOCK

Strengthening

$n \ n' : \text{Nat}$ $Si, Sw, Sc : \text{NatSoup}$ $Q : \text{NatQueue}$

$aux : \text{State} \rightarrow [\text{Bool}]$

$$aux(Si \mid Sw \mid mt \mid Q) = set?(Si \ Sw)$$

$$aux(Si \mid Sw \mid n \mid n @ Q) = set?(Si \ Sw \ n)$$

$$aux(Si \mid Sw \mid n \ n' \ Sc \mid Q) = \perp$$


Outline

- 1 Preliminaries
- 2 Safety Properties
- 3 Proving Stability and Invariance Properties
- 4 Strengthening of Invariants
- 5 The Maude Invariant Analyzer

InvA

Methodology

The InvA Tool is an **interactive environment**, implemented in Full Maude, that assists in the task of proving stability and invariance properties for $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{R}}$ by generating equational subgoals



InvA

Proving $\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \Box \text{mutex}$

Proof

$$\frac{\overline{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \text{aux}}}{\overline{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{aux} \Rightarrow \bigcirc \text{aux}}} \quad \frac{\overline{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{aux} \Rightarrow \Box \text{aux}}}{\overline{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{aux} \Rightarrow \text{mutex}}} \quad \frac{\overline{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{aux} \Rightarrow \bigcirc \text{aux}} \quad \overline{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{aux} \Rightarrow \Box \text{aux}}}{\overline{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \Box \text{mutex}}}$$

InvA

Proving $\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \Box \text{mutex}$

Proof

```
(analyze init(S:State) implies aux(S:State)
  in QLOCK-PROPS .)
rewrites: 4265 in 10ms cpu (11ms real)
Checking QLOCK-PROPS |- init => aux ...
Proof obligations generated: 1
Proof obligations discharged: 1
Success!
```

$$\frac{}{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \text{aux}} \quad \frac{}{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{aux} \Rightarrow \bigcirc \text{aux}} \quad \frac{}{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{aux} \Rightarrow \text{mutex}}$$

$$\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \Box \text{mutex}$$

InvA

Proving $\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \Box \text{mutex}$

Proof

```
(analyze init(S:State) implies aux(S:State)
 in QLOCK-PROPS .)
rewrites: 4265 in 10ms cpu (11ms real)
Checking QLOCK-PROPS |- init => aux ...
Proof obligations generated: 1
Proof obligations discharged: 1
Success!
```

$$\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \text{aux}$$

```
(analyze-stable aux(S:State)
 in QLOCK-PROPS QLOCK .)
rewrites: 42333 in 95ms cpu (100ms real)
Checking QLOCK |- aux => O aux ...
Proof obligations generated: 12
Proof obligations discharged: 12
Success!
```

$$\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{aux} \Rightarrow \bigcirc \text{aux}$$

$$\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{aux} \Rightarrow \Box \text{aux}$$

$$\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{aux} \Rightarrow \text{mutex}$$

$$\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \Box \text{mutex}$$

InvA

Proving $\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \Box \text{mutex}$

Proof

```
(analyze init(S:State) implies aux(S:State)
 in QLOCK-PROPS .)
rewrites: 4265 in 10ms cpu (11ms real)
Checking QLOCK-PROPS |- init => aux ...
Proof obligations generated: 1
Proof obligations discharged: 1
Success!
```

$$\frac{}{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \text{aux}}$$

```
(analyze-stable aux(S:State)
 in QLOCK-PROPS QLOCK .)
rewrites: 42333 in 95ms cpu (100ms real)
Checking QLOCK |- aux => O aux ...
Proof obligations generated: 12
Proof obligations discharged: 12
Success!
```

$$\frac{}{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{aux} \Rightarrow \bigcirc \text{aux}}$$

$$\frac{}{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{aux} \Rightarrow \Box \text{aux}}$$

```
(analyze aux(S:State) implies mutex(S:State)
 in QLOCK-PROPS .)
rewrites: 10007 in 21ms cpu (22ms real)
Checking QLOCK-PROPS |- aux => mutex ...
Proof obligations generated: 3
Proof obligations discharged: 3
Success!
```

$$\frac{}{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{aux} \Rightarrow \text{mutex}}$$

$$\frac{}{\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \Box \text{mutex}}$$

InvA

Proving $\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \Box \text{mutex}$

Proof

```
(analyze init(S:State) implies aux(S:State)
 in QLOCK-PROPS .)
rewrites: 4265 in 10ms cpu (11ms real)
Checking QLOCK-PROPS |- init => aux ...
Proof obligations generated: 1
Proof obligations discharged: 1
Success!
```

$$\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \text{aux}$$

```
(analyze-stable aux(S:State)
 in QLOCK-PROPS QLOCK .)
rewrites: 42333 in 95ms cpu (100ms real)
Checking QLOCK |- aux => O aux ...
Proof obligations generated: 12
Proof obligations discharged: 12
Success!
```

$$\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{aux} \Rightarrow \bigcirc \text{aux}$$

$$\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{aux} \Rightarrow \Box \text{aux}$$

```
(analyze aux(S:State) implies mutex(S:State)
 in QLOCK-PROPS .)
rewrites: 10007 in 21ms cpu (22ms real)
Checking QLOCK-PROPS |- aux => mutex ...
Proof obligations generated: 3
Proof obligations discharged: 3
Success!
```

$$\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{aux} \Rightarrow \text{mutex}$$

$$\mathcal{T}_{\text{QLOCK}} \models \text{init} \Rightarrow \Box \text{mutex}$$

A technical report, the InvA, and more examples are available at

<http://camilorocha.info>

Thank you!